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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ELAINE SIDDOWAY RICHARDS

'

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
HENRY RALPH SIDDOWAY, MARY
SIDDOVVA Y and BEN MORRISON,

Case No.
11800

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Respondents concur generally with the statement
of facts as set forth in Appellant's brief, except that
certain items do require additional darification.
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
Lands from two entirely separate sources was the
subject of the partition proceedings to which reference is made in the Appellant's statement of facts.
ITr. 11, 12, 13, 14)
1

The range land came by distribution through the
will of William H. Siddoway, father of the four sons,
wherein the range land was given in common to the
four sons, three in fee, and the share of \Villiam
Wallace Siddoway in the form of a life estate with
a remainder over to the Appellant. This property is
not in dispute. CTr. 11, 12, 13, 14)
The so-called "McCarrell place," consisting of
approximately 80 acres of farm ground came by distribution in common to the four sons from their
mother's estate, with a fee interest residing in each.
(Tr. 13, 14)
The prayer in the partition proceedings called
for partition in the manner in which the ownership
thus appeared, a life estate to William \Vallace Siddoway in the range land, and a fee interest to William
Wallace Siddoway in the "McCarrell place." (Tr. 4)
After the partition proceedings, William \Vallace
Siddoway conveyed the "McCarrell place" property
to Benjamin Morrison in fee in payment of a debt
owed from Siddoway to Morrison. (R. 14)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD THE PO\\rER AND
AUTHORITY TO CORRECT THE MANIFEST
ERROR IN THE PARTITION DECREE
The question posed by the Appellant at Point I
of her brief, is whether the Court has the rig-ht to
2

1

correct an error in the prior partition proceedings, to
make the trnth and the record conform. The contention is that as a matter of law, the court was precluded from correcting the error.
The Trial Court having heard and considered the
evidence documentary and oral on the subject, concluded that an error existed, and that it was of a clerical nature, and that it would be unjust and inequitable to permit the appellant to take the land. CR. 81,
82, 83, 84, 85)
Rule 60 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedures
authorizes the Court to correct clerical mistakes in
judgments at any time.
"Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or
other parts of the record and errors therein
arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at any time ... "
The principle that clerical errors or mistakes are
not limited to those errors of court personnel only is
well established. Errors, made by attorneys have
been recognized as "clerical errors."
In Hawks u. i'\1.cCormack, 190 Okla. 569, 71 P. 2d
724, an erroneous journal entry prepared by counsel
for the defendant and approved by counsel for the
plaintiff was corrected as a clerical error.
An oversight in which there was a failure to
reserve jurisdiction of the court in a written decree
3

of divorce was held to be a clerical error in Silva
v.
Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 57 Nevada 468, 66 P. 2d 422.
In the case in re Goldberg's Estate, 10 Cal. 2nd
709, 76 P. 2d 508, the will in question provided for
the distribution among four children. The petition
prayed for distribution to those entitled and the
decree granted distribution in accordance with the
terms of the will. However, the decree inadvertently
omitted one of the children provided for in the will.
The Court held this to be a clerical error.
The test of a clerical error appears to be whether
the Court was exercising judicial discretion in its
application to the particular matter. Benway vs.
Benway, 69 Cal. App. 2nd 574, 159 P. 2d 682, and
cases cited above.
It seems clear m this case from the evidence
which was undisputed, that the error came in retyping the decree from the pleadings and that no
judicial discretion was involved.
Counsel argues in his brief that Rule 60 ( b) precludes the court from correcting an error in a judgment at any time after 90 days, except for fraud.
This argument is contrary to the actual wording
of the rule and is clearly contrary to the intent of
the rule and the expression of this court in the recent
case Haner vs. Haner, 13 Utah 2nd 299, 373 P. 2d
/) 77.
4

A fair reading of Rule 60 Cb) indicates that only
under situations ( 1), (2), ( 3) and ( 4) must the
motion in the same proceedings be brought within
three months. Situations under ( 5), ( 6), and ( 7) are
excluded from the three months provision.
Following the reasoning in the Haner case, and
the statement of this court therein, the trial court
found this to be a case where the processes of justice
will have been completely thwarted if the entire
judgment in the partition proceedings were to be
allowed to stand without correction.
The result otherwise would be a windfall of 20
acres of farm land to a party clearly not entitled
thereto, at the expense of the heirs of Benjamin
Morrison, Morrison having been deeded the property
for value during his lifetime. CR. 14, Tr. 23, 24).
Rule 60 (b) further provides:
" ... This rules does not limit the power of the
the court to entertain an independent action
to relieve a party from a judgment, order or
proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for
fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be
by motion as prescribed in these rules or by
an independent action."
Thus it is clear that authorization is granted for
'
a motion within the same proceedings or in an
independent action for relief from a judgment.

In the present instance, there is no effort to vacate
the judgment. The substance of the judgment of the
court in the partition suit stands and is affirmed by
the parties. The only effort is to correct one
of that judgment which by the evidence was erroneous and in need of correction.
It is also clear that authorization exists within
the a hove-quoted portion of the rule, for relief to be
granted for reasons other than fraud on the court, as
argued by the appellant. Haner vs. Haner, 13 Ut. 2d
299, 373 P. 2d 577.
Independent of rule 60, however, it is asserted by
the Respondents, that there is inherent power existing in the Court to correct its judgments, and that
even a statutory limitation does not limit the power
of the court to correct its judgment in a proper case.
Cazell vs. Cazell, 133 Kans. 766, 3 P. 2d 479; In re
Goldberg, 10 Cal. 2d 709, 76 P. 2d 508, where the
statute fixed the period at one year and the correction
was made 35 years later; In re Gold, 8 N.Y. S. 2d 714i
Brown v. Cole 196 Ga. 843, 28 S.E. 2d 76; Partch v.
Baird, 227 Mich. 660, 199
692.
POINT II
RESPONDENTS WERE NOT PRECLUDED BY
LACHES OR DELAY FROM ASSERTING THE
RIGHT TO HA VE THE ERROR CORRECTED
The argument made by appellant relative to
laches is one which more appropriately should be
6
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addressed to the lower court before whom this matter
was tried.
Respondents recognize the proposition asserted by
.:-\ppellant. However, the trial court had before it all
of the facts, including the fact that discovery by
Respondents of the error came about only after
appellant began her lawsuit, (Tr. 35, 36) and had
before it all of the facts pertinent to the delays in
filing of the answer seeking affirmative relief (R. 23).
The trial court ruled upon the matters concerning delay in the discovery of the error and in pressing action for relief from the error adversely to the
appellant.
1be facts sustain the Court in its order setting
aside the default and allowing the answer asking
affirmative relief to be granted. It appears from the
record that much of the delay was also attributable
to the appellant. The pre-trial order makes no further
mention of the question of laches, and it was not an
issue further raised by the appellant in the Trial
Court.
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POINT III
THE EVIDENCE JUSTIFIED THE LOWER
COURT IN ITS DECISION TO CORRECT THE
ERROR IN THE PR OBA TE DECREE
Although the Appellant states as Point III, that
"the evidence does not justify finding of mistake "
''
the burden of the argument at this point is not that
the evidence does not sustain the findings, but rather,
that certain evidence should have been excluded because it violates certain rules of evidence, The Hearsay Rule, the Dead Man's Statute and the Legal Conclusions Rule.
Appellant fails to point out what oral evidence
was violative of each or all of these rules of evidence,
making only the broad generalized assertion that it
does violate these rules of evidence.

It is not the intention of Respondents to analyzp
each answer of each witness in order to sustain each
ruling of the trial court to matters of evidence, nor
would it appear to be the duty or Respondents to do
so.

It should be pointed out, however, that no objection was interposed to any of the testimony which
was admitted on the basis of hearsay, or on the basis
of the dead man's statute, and that on only two
occasions did the appellant object to evidence on the
ground that it was testimony about a legal conI11 each instance the answer was given prior
·
c1us10n.
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to the objection, and in neither instance did counsel
ask that the testimony be stricken. In the one
instance, cross examination, without objection, went
into the same subject matter. (Tr. 33, 34, 35)
In the other instance, Anna B. Morrison who was
the secretary who typed the findings and decree testified that the inclusion of the twenty acres in the
decree with a remainder over to Elaine S. Richards
was an error CTr. 37). An objection was interposed to
her answer, but no request was made that it be
stricken. (Since it is apparent that as the typist she
knew whether she had made an error in putting the
document together, it would not appear that this
testimony would be in the nature of an objectionable
conclusion in any event.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully urged that in this matter the
Trial Court correctly applied the law to the facts and
corrected what would otherwise have been a manifest
injustice, and that the judgment of the Trial Court

should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
COLTON & HAMMOND
Attorneys for Respondents
Vernal, Utah
DEAN W. SHEFFIELD
On the brief
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